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ABSTRACT 
This article' is intended for non-speciaiists who would like to understand the state of play in 
syntactic theory. It introduces nine different syntactic theories which count as 'important' in 
some sense, and explains some of the assumptions that they make about sentence structure. It 
aiso discusses the various kinds of solutions that have been offered for one problem, that of 
discontinuities produced by topicalisation, and introduces a tenth theory which rests on 
fundamentally different assumptions. 
l .  The aim of the garne 
Current work on syntax is like a garne of football, in which each good idea 
counts as a goal. There is just one set of goal-posts (though from time to time 
a group of players may try to shift them), and one goal-keeper: The Facts. The 
balls which the players try to get past the goal-keeper are theories, rules, 
principles - ideas about the workings of grammars of particular languages or of 
languages in general. In principle, the winner at any given time is the person 
or group with the highest number of goals scored; but in reality there's some 
confusion not only about the scoring system but even about which balls have 
scored at all. There's no referee, and new facts are coming to light al1 the time, 
so some of today's apparent goals may be disqualified by tomorrow's new facts. 
Most people who are actually playing the game seem to enjoy it - why else 
would they be playing? However, inexperienced spectators can find it al1 rather 
confusing, and it is for them that this article is intended. 
LetS start by looking at the balls. Unlike real football, there isn't just one, 
but an unlimited supply (so in this respect the game is more like playing with 
a pin-ball machine than football). Another difference is that the players 
1. My thanks to And Rosta, Anat Ninio and an anonyrnous reviewer for comments on the first draft 
of this paper. 
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themselves have to make the balls before they try to kick them through the 
goal-posts, because each ball is an idea. For example, suppose you were working 
on the syntax of questions in English and you had noticed examples like the 
following. 
(1) a. It is hot in Barcelona. 
b. 1s it hot in Barcelona? 
You know that is is a verb, and that it is its subject, so your first idea might 
be that you form questions by putting the verb before its subject. Unfortunately 
this won't score a goal, because it comes up against the fact that the question 
c~rrespondin~ to (2a) is (2b) and not the form predicted by your idea, (2c) 
(which is ungrammatical, as shown by the *). 
(2) a. It gets hot in Barcelona. 
b. Does it get hot in Barcelona? 
c. * Gets it hot in Barcelona? 
Something is wrong with this idea, so you have to change it into a different 
one, and you go on changing it until it gets past the goal-keeping facts. It doesn't 
matter if someone else has already scored with that ball; we often reinvent one 
another's ideas, or reuse them, and in the long run al1 that counts is whether 
an idea is true, and not where it came from or who invented it. 
The aim of the game, then, is to work out ideas which fit the facts. Ideas 
come in many different shapes and sizes, differing both in generality and 
abstractness. Here is a sample of ideas of increasing degrees of generality: 
(3) a. Is must have a subject. 
b. In English, a tensed auxiliary verb must have a subject. 
c. In English, a tensed verb must have a subject. 
d. In English, a verb must have a subject. 
e. In every language, a verb must have a subject. 
Provided we can recognise a subject, it is relatively easy to decide whether 
(3a) is true, but it becomes increasingly difficult to check the claims as we go 
down the list. Similarly for abstractness; the following statements al1 relate to 
sentence (la). 
(4) a. Is consists of i followed by s. 
b. Is consists of a stem i followed by a suffix s. 
c. Is is the 3rd-singular present form of the verb BE. 
d. Is has a subject, it. 
e. Is is the 'main verb' of the sentence. 
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Obviously there is a limit to the number of goals that can be scored with 
- 
ideas that are very concrete and very specific; the prizes go to those who can 
climb these hierarchies. In general, the hierarchies are closely related: as claims 
become more general, they have to be stated in terms of more abstract concepts. 
And more importantly, the more general or abstract we get, the more intercon- 
nected each claim is with other claims - e.g., we cant decide whether every 
language requires its verbs to have subjects until we know whether every 
language has verbs and subjects, which we can't decide without clear notions 
of the concepts 'verb' and 'subject'. 
Every player faces this same need to match very specific facts with more 
general ones, but of course different players have different personalities and 
different interests. Some are happy to focus on a narrow range of facts with the 
aim of discovering more and better general facts underlying them; others prefer 
to keep a wide range of phenomena in their sights in the hope of discovering 
links arnong them; and others again have practical interests such as language- 
teaching which oblige them to consider the full range of facts, without 
necessarily pushing for much generalisation. Al1 these interests are legitimate 
and mutually supportive, but 1 think it is important to beware of claims that 
'description and 'explanation' are alternatives. We can+ explain things we cant 
describe, nor can we describe things we can't understand. 
What sorts of facts are syntacticians responsible for, as syntacticians? We al1 
agree that syntax is the study of how words combine with one another, so we 
are at least responsible for the study of word-order and for the choice of words 
where the choice of one word is dependent on some other word with which it 
cooccurs - for the fact that in (la) Barcelona must follow in, that is must be 
accompanied by a nominal such as it, and that this must be singular rather than 
plural. 
There is some disagreement about the extent of our responsibility for the 
internal structure of words; e.g. is it the syntactician's job to break gets into get 
plus S? There is also disagreement about where the game of syntax changes into 
semantics; an example of this disagreement would be whether we are playing 
syntax or semantics when we say that in Barcelona defines a location. 1 discuss 
this in section 4. These disagreements are important, as we shall see, but the 
shared ground makes it quite clear that basically we are al1 playing the same 
game, with the same aim. 
2. Introducing the players 
The typical syntactician is an academic working in a university or research 
institute, but an increasing number of syntacticians are to be found in organi- 
sations with more immediate aims which include the production of computer 
software for handling ordinary language, translation of religious texts and 
diagnosis of medical conditions connected with language. An important area 
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of activity is the training of school teachers and preparation of materials for use 
in schools, where modern syntax has many possible applications. 
Even if we simplify the picture by ignoring syntacticians who have clear 
applications in view, there are considerable differences of which any spectator 
should be aware. Some syntacticians work on rather concrete and particular 
matters such as writing a dictionary of some language, or working out al1 the 
finer details of some small but complex area of English syntax (e.g., what are 
the rules for using the word AS?); others choose to concentrate on much more 
general and abstract things, tackling questions like 'What kinds of word-order 
rules are there?' Some concentrate on English, others work on some other 
language, while others again study a small range of phenomena across hundreds 
of languages at the same time. Some like to keep firmly within syntax, as 
narrowly defined, whereas others try to relate their work on syntax to more 
general issues and to the analysis of other parts of language. Al1 these differences 
are healthy and potentially productive (of new discoveries and insights, al1 
potential goal-scorers) . 
Unfortunately there are other differences which are less welcome, and which 
are probably counterproductive because they quite unnecessarily prevent cross- 
fertilisation of ideas. These differences include one which is symbolised by the 
slogans 'functional grammar' and 'formal grammar' (see Lightfoot 1992 and 
Thompson 1992 for clear and brief summaries of these ideologies). 'Functio- 
nalists' like to emphasise the social and communicative functions of language, 
whereas the 'formalists' tend to emphasise its formal patterns. 
For example, we might compare a functionalist a i d  a formalist answer to 
the question why moving is before it in (1) should produce a question. A 
functionalist (e.g., Halliday 1985) might answer that is carries the sentence's 
'polarity', the contrast between positive and negative, so ifyou wanted to show 
that the sentence was 'about' the truth of the proposition that it is hot in 
Barcelona, it makes sense to start with the word that is most directly related to 
truth, namely is. In contrast, a formalist (Chomsky 1986) would look for a 
'formal' explanation, in terms of formal patterns; e.g., one notices that the 
position of is looks like that of a subordinator such as that in (5). 
(5) a. 1 know that it is hot in Barcelona. 
b. 
I I I  
1s it - hot in Barcelona. 
The 'formal' explanation, then, is that is fills the slot which is also available 
for that. If is which is inverted round the subject competes for a single 'slot' 
with that, this would explain why inversion never occurs with that (or, for that . 
matter, with other subordinating words like whether, which presumably fit into 
the same slot): 
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(6) a. * 1 wonder whether is it hot in Barcelona. 
b. 1 wonder whether it is hot in Barcelona. 
Both the formal and the functional explanations have some plau~ibilit~, so 
which is right? 
The rhetoric around the distinction between functionalists and formalists 
sometimes suggests that the battle is between hearts and minds (heartless 
concentration on mere form, or mindless concentration on rather nebulous 
function). But this is nonsense, because when pushed every formalist would 
agree whole-heartedly that language has communicative and social functions, 
and every functionalist would also agree that language is a system of formal 
patterns. Both the formal patterning and the functions are among the data 
which the goal-keeper knows about, and the only ideas about language that 
will score are those which are compatible with al1 the relevant data. 
Returning to our example, it is quite posible, in principle, that both 
accounts of the position of is in (lb) are correct: what is and that have in 
common is that they indicate the relation of the clause's basic meaning to the 
context, and it is (functionally) helpful to the hearer to have this information 
before starting to process the rest of the sentence. If they share a (formal) slot 
in the sentence's structure, there may be a functional explanation for it. As a 
matter of fact, this particular formal analysis may not be right because that and 
inverted is can in fact cooccur, as in (7). 
(7) 1 know that only in summer ir it hot in Barcelona. 
But whatever the merits of this analysis, the point remains that the inverted 
verb and the subordinators like THAT are formally similar inter alia in that 
they both occur near the start of the clause, and we can't te11 in advance whether 
the explanation for these similarities will be in purely formal terms or purely 
functional ones or a mixture of the two. Formal and functionai approaches are 
complementary and mutually dependent, so spectators, as potential 'custo- 
mers', should beware of high-pressure sales rhetoric. 
3. Some important teams 
Syntax is complicated, and any syntactician, however modest their aims may 
be, needs an intellectual framework within which to locate each claim - a set 
of general categories (such as 'verb' or 'subject'), and a set of general ideas about 
how sentences are structured and about the workings of a grammar. There is a 
widely agreed set of general categories, many of which are traditional both in 
their names and in their meanings; but there is no generally agreed framework. 
Instead, there are a relatively large number of competing alternatives. 
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Faced with these choices, one option for a syntactician is to playa lone game 
using a more or less 'theory-neutral' set of assumptions but avoiding issues that 
require a more sophisticated set of assumptions. Another option is to follow 
the even more lonely road of building a coherent framework of oneS own. But 
the most popular option is to adopt one of the available frameworks. Although 
this requires time and effort, it is the easiest of the options because inventing 
your own theory is a life's work, and the 'theory-neutral' option is very limiting 
- rather like playing football with bare feet, when it is wise to think twice before 
kicking any given ball in case it damages your toes. A profes~ionall~ constructed 
theory is like a good pair of boots, which will allow the wearer to tackle al1 sorts 
of interesting problems that couldn't even be stated without a theory. 
Moreover, by opting for theory X you automatically join the ranks of 
syntacticians who use theory X, the theory X 'team'. This is important because 
you can communicate easily with other members of the same team, you can use 
their ideas, and (hopefully) they will use your ideas. The intellectual bonds may 
lead to friendships, jobs, fame, ... There are al1 sorts of reasons for joining a team, 
not al1 connected, or at least not directly, to the correctness of the tea& theory. 
What, then, are the most important teams in the syntax game? It al1 depends 
on what you mean by 'important', but by almost any standards of importance, 
the one that comes out on top is Government-Binding Theoy (GB, alias 
PrinciplesandParameters Theoy, alias, in the dim distant past, Transformational 
Grammar, Salkie 1990, Lyons 1970191). The tradition including GB and its 
precursors is the brain child of Noam Chomsky, who must be the most famous 
linguist (certainly the most famous syntactician) in the world, measured in 
terms of media coverage and general fame beyond the academic community. 
Partly because of its popularity, there is actually enormous diversity among 
practicioners of GB, and much more so than in any of the other theories which 
1 shall mention below, so it would probably be more accurate to describe GB 
as a family of theories. After 35 years of theory-building Chomsky is still a fast 
worker, and his thinking is currently going through a particularly radical 
revision; so al1 of his followers are (by definition) to some extent out of date, 
and some are extremely so. Moreover, although he is clearly the leader of the 
team, many of the members are outstandingly good syntacticians and thinkers, 
capable of disagreeing with him on important issues. Consequently two articles 
both claiming to apply GB theory may well presuppose radically different, and 
incompatible, assumptions on key issues. 
The dominant position of GB becomes evident from the professional 
journals that regulady carry articles on syntax. GB is the only theoretical 
framework that needs neither justification nor explanation because it is gene- 
rally assumed that the typical reader already understands, and probably accepts, 
some version of GB. The same is true ofconference papers presented to societies 
such as the Linguistic Society of America and the Linguistics Association of 
Great Britain. 
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Having said this, though, 1 must make it clear that other theories are 
- - 
important, in one sense or another, as well. Let's consider first the matter of 
social importance - the size, coherence and organisation of the teams. By this 
criterion we must recognise three other theories as important: Systemic (Func- 
tionai) Grammar (Halliday 1985, Butler 1985), Functional Grammar (Dik 
1989, 1991, Siewierska 1991) and Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1990, 
199 1). Al1 these teams have a newsletter or a journal and annual meetings which 
are held in a variety of countries and involve hundreds of participants. The 
same is true of GB, which qualifies as important in any case. Interestingly the 
first three teams are strongly committed to the slogans of the 'functional' 
approach, even to the extent of denying the existence of formal patterns in 
syntax (in the case of Cognitive Grammar); while the GB team is equally 
dedicated to the 'formal' approach. One suspects that the slogans may have an 
important social function for the teams. 
Another test of importance is the extent of representation in the interna- 
tional refereed journals. Here too we find the GB team well ahead of its rivals, 
but in this case the rivals are a completely different set. A few years ago it could 
have been said that the main two were Lexical-Functional Grdmmar (Bresnan 
1982, Wescoat and Zaenen 199 1) and Generalised Phrase-Structure Grammar 
(Gazdar et al 1985); these two, plus GB, were singled out for special treatment 
in two excellent introductory books, Sells (1985) and Horrocks (1987). More 
recently, though, the field has changed somewhat. LFG is still represented, but 
GPSG has generally been abandoned in favour of Head-driven Phrase-Structure 
Gmmmar (Pollard and Sag 1987). Borsley 199 1 is a good introduction to both 
GPSG and HPSG, as well as to GB. Meanwhile there has been an increase in 
output from two older theories, Categorial Grammar (Wood forthcoming) and 
Relational Grammar (Blake 1990, Aissen 199 1). 
In spite of the word 'Functional' in the name of LFG, al1 these theories tend 
to focus on formal patterning, though without precluding functional links to 
meaning, to processing and so on. The functional approach tends to be 
represented in the professional journals by rather theory-neutral analyses of 
large amounts of cross-linguistic data in the 'typological' tradition (Comrie 
1981189). 
A third measure of importance is in terms of applications, i.e. 'spectators' 
of the syntax game who are basically not playing the game but using the ideas. 
This is the one criterion by which GB does not emerge as the leader; indeed, 
it would be fair to see that in most applications GB is nowhere in sight (though 
this may change if current activity in GB bears fruit). In the field of language 
teaching, the most widely applied theory of syntax is probably Systemic 
Functional Grammar (SFG). In computer applications too SFG is popular, as 
are also Lexical Functional Grammar, Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar, 
Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar and Categorial Grammar (Winograd 
1983). 
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None of these measures is inherently and directly connected to the question 
of truth (compatibility with al1 known facts). It is quite possible for a theory to 
be extremely popular, and widely used in the professional literature, and widely 
used in applications, without being the best available in objective terms - i.e., 
the nearest to the truth. It would probably be fair to say that most syntacticians 
apply the theory that they learned first, because that is the theory they 
understand best, and not because they have seriously compared it with its rivals. 
The theory learned first depends on the linguistics department where syntax 
was first studied, which in turn depends on al1 sorts of social, geographical, 
economic and academic considerations. Nor does publication in a refereed 
journal guarantee truth; al1 it means is that typical readers will relate easily to 
the contents. And would-be-appliers of syntactic theories tend to want a 
detailed and reasonably coherent and explicit description, rather than a theory 
as such. So it may be that the prize for truth could still go to the future 
descendant of a theory which is still out of sight in terms of our three criteria. 
(1 hope this is so, at any rate, for reasons which will become clear at the end of 
the article!) 
The general conclusion of this discussion is that al1 these theories are 
claimed, by their proponents, to be more or less true; how could it be otherwise? 
Moreover although their proponents typically have different interests, ulti- 
mately they are al1 going to have to mesh, sooner or later, with the same reality. 
Nor can we realistically divide the theories, as some people like to do, into those 
which aim at 'description' and those whose aim is 'explanation'. Once again, 
their proponents or users may differ but 1 don't know of any theory which 
provides a description of a range of facts without also trying to explain at least 
some of them. Advocates of GB are particularly prone to claim that in some 
sense GB is especially good at explaining things, or at least that explanation is 
particularly high on the agenda in GB work. In my experience this is simply 
false in both directions. The other theories al1 aim at explanation, and 1 know 
linguists who use GB simply as a descriptive framework, without paying much 
attention to its success in explaining. 
We have arrived at the following list of syntactic theories which count as 
important by one or more of the above criteria: 
Categorial Grammar 
Cognitive Grammar 
Functional Grammar 
Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar 
Government Binding Theory (GB) 
Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar 
Lexical-Functional Grammar 
Relational Grammar 
Systemic Functional Grammar 
A spectator's guide to syntactic theories Links & Letters 1, 1994 33 
4. Syntax and meaning 
Everyone agrees that words, when combined together, express meaning, and 
that the meaning that a string of words express varies according to how the 
words are combined. The meanings that are expressed form some kind of 
specifically 'semantic' structure, so we al1 agree that a string of words (let's cal1 
it a sentence) has a semantic structure. We don't agree on what belongs in this 
semantic structure, but at least it must show the sense of each word, and 
whatever semantic relations there are among the words. We also agree that a 
sentence has a phonological structure, describable in terms of syllables, conso- 
nants, vowels and so on. The question for us to consider is what role syntax 
plays between the semantic and phonological structures. 
One of our theories, Cognitive Grammar, claims that there is no specifically 
syntactic structure, since each word is a Saussurean 'sign' with just two parts, a 
meaning (signifié) and a phonological form (signifiant). There are syntactic 
rules, but al1 they do is control the mapping relation between the phonological 
and semantic structures; for example, some rules control the order in which 
phonological structures occur. There are no specifically syntactic categories like 
'verb' or 'subject', because al1 such categories are claimed to be definable in 
semantic terms. 
Speaking personally, 1 am convinced this claim is wrong, but 1 have to admit 
that it is surprisingly hard to argue the case against it. A particularly serious 
obstacle is the uncertainty about semantic structures; one of the characteristics 
of Cognitive Grammar semantic structures is how closely they correspond to 
syntactic structures in other theories - e.g., it is claimed that there is a semantic 
category that is shared by ail and only nouns, in spite of the apparent diversity 
among nouns like John, milk, beauty and explosion. 
At the other extreme, GB claims that the specifically syntactic structure 
of a sentence is very rich indeed, and incorporates information which other 
theories would put only in the semantic structure. For example, take 
sentence (8). 
(8) Everyone told one person their name. 
Does this mean the same as (9a) or (9b), and whose name was it that was 
told - the teller's, or the hearer's, or someone else's? 
(9) a. For everyone there was one person to whom they told their name. 
b. There was one person to whom everyone told their name. 
These are considered to be syntactic questions in GB, and the syntactic 
anaiysis of a sentence includes one sub-structure, the 'Logicai Form', whose 
purpose is to provide the answers. Rather strangely, there is very little discussion 
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of the semantic structure as such, and in particular no discussion of whether it 
makes Logical Form redundant. 
It would be fair to say that GB incorporates a lot of what others cal1 
semantics into the syntactic structures, whereas we saw that Cognitive 
Grammar does the opposite, incorporating 'syntactic' information into the 
semantic structure. Another rather unhelpful slogan that divides syntacticians 
is the question of whether or not syntax is 'autonomous'. Not too surprisingly, 
GB supporters claim that it is and people with more functional inclinations 
disagree; and the sides claim to be disagreeing over whether there are syntactic 
structures controlled by purely syntactic rules. But in view of the ease with 
which syntactic information slops into the supposedly semantic structures, and 
vice versa, it is hard to see what the argument is really about. 
Most of the other theories represent a third position, which recognises a 
syntactic structure distinct from a semantic one and puts semantic phenomena 
like the ambiguity of (8) only in the semantic structure. The syntactic structure 
describes the words and phrases of the sentence in terms of categories like 'noun' 
and (possibly) 'subject', in contrast with the semantic structure which in most 
cases is some form of the predicate calculus. 
A fourth possibility is to recognise a single structure which combines 
syntactic and semantic information on equal footing - a 'syntactico-semantic' 
structure. This position is taken by two of our theories: Systemic Functional 
Grammar and Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar. Not surprisingly, it is 
quite hard to see exactly how this view is different from the no-syntax view of 
Cognitive Grammar; but it is equally hard to distinguish it from the ignore-se- 
mantics view of GB. On the other hand, it is quite easy to distinguish from the 
third position, where the two structures are kept clearly separate. 
To summarise, we have seen a good deal of disagreement over the relations 
between syntactic and semantic structures. This is one of the main sources of 
difficulty in comparing syntactic theories, because theories differ over the 
phenomena that syntax is supposed to deal with, from very little (Cognitive 
Grammar) to virtually everything (GB). 
5.  Phrases 
Another point of general agreement is that the syntactic organisation of a 
sentence (regardless of whether or not this is distinct from its semantic 
organisation) is hierarchical, in the sense that smaller units cluster to make up 
larger units, with the whole sentence as the largest unit of all. 
This structure is typically shown by a tree, as in (1 0) (a vastly oversimplified 
example, as you will probably realise). 
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Dogs chase postmen 
In this diagram, S and V stand for 'sentence' and 'verb' respectively, but you 
can interpret 'NP' as you prefer: either as 'noun-phrase', or as 'noun or 
pronoun'. The first is the modern view, the latter the traditional one. 
Tree-diagrarns like (10) are not the only notation available; there are a 
number of alternatives. One is a labelled bracketing such as (1 1); this is 
common in the GB literature, and also in Functional Grammar. 
Another is an upside-down tree (perhaps more accurately, a 'non-upside- 
down tree'), using the special category-system of Categorial Grammar: 
(12) Dogs chase postmen. 
NP (S\NP)/NP NP 
In this system, the category 'transitive verb' is represented as '(S\N)/N', 
meaning 'a word which, having combined with a following NP, then combines 
with a preceding one, the result being S'. 
Yet another notation that is widely used is like a conventional tree rotated 
through 90 degrees, with brackets instead of branches. The various labels are 
assigned to slots with names like 'CAT(egory)' and 'FORM': 
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This notation is common in Lexical-Functional Grammar, Generalised Phrase 
Structure Grammar and Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar. 
These notations al1 reflect the same basic insight, namely that a sentence 
can be divided into successively smaller units. 
6. Features and functions 
Each of these notational systems has its advantages and its disadvantages, but 
one of the main differences involves theoretical assumptions about the location 
of information. Basically, any syntactic diagram has two parts: the geometry 
and the labels. The geometry shows what is related to what - i.e., in the cases 
considered so far, what is part of what, and what comes before what (e.g., that 
chase is a part of charepostmen, and precedes postmen). The geometry depends 
on the shape of the tree, the order of words and the brackets round them, and 
so on. The labels are attached to the parts related by the geometry. Where 
theories differ radically is in their claims about the balance of information load 
between geometry and labels. At one extreme is GB, which puts most of the 
information about sentence structure into the geometry, and very little into the 
labels. In most GB discussions the labels are simple atomic categories like 'NP' 
and 'V' and a set of 'size' labels, to distinpish between single words and phrases. 
For exarnple, while a single noun is labelled 'N', a complete phrase consisting 
of a noun and al1 its associated words is labelled 'NP', for 'noun-phrase'. 
Between N and NP comes N' (read 'en-bar'), which is a noun plus its 
complements (its most closely related dependent phrases). A standard (though 
somewhat old-fashioned) example of this kind of analysis is (14). 
A student of linguistics with long hair 
Other theories differ from this extremely geometrical approach in various 
ways. Generalised Phrase Structure Grammmar, for example, makes a great deal 
of use of syntactic 'features', or cooccurring categories, for classiSring words and 
phrases; thus a verb might have a dozen or so features showing its tense, its 
subject-agreement, its transitivity, and so on, in addition to the fact that it is a 
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verb. (In principie features are also available in GB, but in fact they are rarely 
used.) Categorial Grammar provides a very complex decomposable label for 
each word which shows directly how it can combine with other words (e.g., 
'S\NP' is the label for an intransitive verb, showing that it will combine with a 
preceding noun to make a sentence). The use ofthese rich labelling systelns 
reduces the informational load on the geometry; indeed, in the case of Cate- 
gorial Grammar it is sometimes claimed that the geometry carries no informa- 
tion at all. 
Relational Grammar, on the other hand, puts a great deal of information 
into function labels like 'subject' and 'object', which are completely absent (as 
a matter of principie) from the basic categories of GB, Generalised Phrase 
Structure Grarnmar and Categorial Grammar structures; but it makes virtually 
no use at al1 of cla~sificator~ categories. Some theories use both kinds of label; 
this is true of Lexical Functional Grammar, Functional Grammar and Systemic 
Functional Grammar, and to a lesser extent of Head-driven Phrase Structure 
Grammar. 
The reason why these theoretical differences affect one's choice of notation 
is that if you have a great deal of information to put into the labels, then you 
need plenty of space to write it al1 down. At one extreme, the one-dimensional 
labelled brackets of example (1 1) are absolutely useless from this point of view; 
but at the other extreme, the boxed two-dimensional brackets of (13) are ideally 
suited to carrying a lot of information in the labels. This is why theories which 
emphasise labels rather than geometry prefer this notation. 
There is a rather obvious pay-off between the two approaches. The more 
information you put into the geometry, the more complex it has to be; and the 
more information you put into the labels, the less complex the geometry is. 
This is especially so when the extra information in labels is functional infor- 
mation, i.e. relating to the function of the word or phrase concerned in relation 
to the rest of the sintence. 
Avery simple example of this balance involves the basic structure of a simple 
clause like our earlier example, Dofs chase postmen: does the clause have three 
parts (subject, verb and object) or just two (subject and predicate or 'verb-phra- 
se'), the second of which can be split further? Suppose you exclude labels like 
'subject' and 'object'; how then will your sentence diagrams distinguish the 
subject from the object, given that they are both NP? If the distinction cant be 
made in the labels, it must be made in the geometry; we might consider defining 
the subiect simply as the noun that comes before the verb, but that wouldn't 
work iiview oLamples like our (lb), where the subject and verb are inverted; 
therefore the only possibility is to use phrase structure, i.e. by introducing an 
extra phrase. This is the verb-phrase, labelled 'VP' in the example structures. 
But what ifyou do allow functional labels like 'subject'? In that case ofcourse 
the problem disappears; you identifi the subject simply by applying the label 
'subject' to it. There may be other reasons for grouping the verb and object 
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together as verb-phrase, but at least the matter is open to debate. A very simple 
generalisation about syntactic theories is that every theory which disallows 
functional labels does require the verb-phrase; this is the kind of analysis 
assumed in al1 the earlier examples. But there are also theories in which the 
verb-phrase plays no part: Relational Grammar, Systemic Functional Grammar 
and Functional Grammar; and what these theories al1 have in common is that 
they do allow functional labels. This is a simple example of the fundamental 
ways in which the theoretical assumptions you start with may affect your 
analysis of a sentence's structure. 
7. The need to enrich phrase-structure 
We have assumed so far that the syntactic analysis of a sentence is rather simple: 
you divide the sentence into its parts, and go on dividing these until you reach 
the smallest units (which, rather controversially, we shall take to be single 
words). You show how these parts and subparts fit together by some kind of 
diagram; and you add labels to the parts, showing how they can be classified 
(as nouns, noun-phrases, etc) andlor what their function in the sentence is (as 
subject, etc.). Unfortunately, this is far too simple to cope with the patterns 
that are actually found in language. 
To see the problem, consider the apparently simple sentences in (15a). 
(1 5) a. Fred likes syntax. 
b. Syntax Fred likes. 
In (1 5a) it is clear that Fred is the subject of likes syntax (or, if you prefer, of likes 
- or even of the whole sentence); a suitable tree would be the one in (16). 
(16) A 
Subj:NP 
A d : w  
V 0bj:NP 
Fred likes syntax 
You will notice that 1 have made al1 the most favourable possible assumptions, 
by using not only a verb-phrase, but also functional labels ('Subj', 'Obj'). 
Consider next sentence (15b). In case you think this is a rather odd, 
un-English sentence, imagine it as part of a larger sentence, such as Syntax Fred 
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likes, butsemantics he can't stand. Syntacticians often cal1 a front-shifted element 
like syntax in this sentence the 'topic'. The structure for this sentence is 
presumably something like the following: 
Topic, 0bj:NP Subj:NP 
predl:w 
v 
Syntax Fred likes. 
1 have again made the most favourable assumptions 1 could about the shape of 
the tree and its labels, but in spite of these, a serious problem has emerged: 
syntax now has a divided allegiánce, benveen the sentekce (of which it is-the 
topic), and the verb-phrase (of which it is the object). The problem is that this 
kind of analysis does not allow us to show both of these relationships. We are 
restricted to dividing the sentence into smaller and smaller parts, and ifwe take 
syntax as one of the main parts of the whole sentence, we can't also take it as a 
part of one of these parts, the verb-phrase. 
One initially attractive reaction to this problem is to opt for the 'object' link, 
i.e., to pretend that this sentence, Syntax Fredlikes, is just the same as Fred likes 
syntax. The trouble is that they are in fact different in ways that any grammarian 
must pay attention to. For exarnple, we ought to be able to say how 'topicalised' 
objects are used (e.g., for contrast with a topicalised object in a neighbouring 
clause); but we cant say anything about them without distinguishing them. 
Moreover, we must say whereabouts in the sentence a topicalised object can 
occur - e.g., before the subject, but after a time expression and also after a 
subordinating word like THAT which marks the sentence as subordinate: 
(1 8) a. * Fred syntax likes. 
b. Nowadays, syntax Fred likes. 
c. * Syntax nowádays Fred likes. 
d. 1 think that Fred likes syntax. 
e. 1 think that syntax Fred likes, but ... 
f. * 1 think syntax that Fred likes, but ... 
In short, we cant ignore the fact that syntax, when it is topicalised, behaves as 
though it were an immediate part of the whole sentence, rather than of the 
verb-phrase. 
Nor, however, can we take the opposite tack, namely pretending that syntax 
is only the topic. Syntax counts as the object of likes just as much when it is 
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topicalised as when it is in its normal position. For example, omitting it leads 
in both cases to ungrammaticality, for the simple reason that likes needs an 
object. But aren't we in fact showing this relation by labelling syntax 'Obj' in 
diagram (17)? (1 should emphasise that most of the theories in our collection 
would not in fact use functional labels like 'Obj', so we are considering the 
most favourable possible analysis.) No, we aren't; and the reason is that although 
we may be marking syntax as the object of something, the label 'Obj' doesn't, 
in itself, te11 us what syntax is the object of. When it is in its normal position, 
we can te11 easily that it is the object of likes, because the convention is thar an 
element marked 'Obj' is the obje;t of the verb inside the same verb-phrase. But 
what if syntax is not inside any verb-phrase, as in the analysis in (17)? The 
convention breaks down. 
It would be reasonable to see this as making a mountain out of a very small 
mole-hill. Al1 we need is an extra convention, for topicalised objects: 'if 
something is labelled both Obj and Topic, treat it as the object of the next 
verb-phrase.' This would work for our current example, but unfortunately, it 
doesn't solve the problem because topicalisation can move an object out of its 
own clause into a 'higher' one. To see this, consider the next two examples. 
(1 9) a. Fred denies that he likes syntax. 
b. Syntax Fred denies that he likes. 
Here is a structure for the second of these examples: 
I 
i 
I 
v 
Syntax Fred denies rhat he likes. 
Once again 1 have made the most favourable assumptions that 1 could; but the 
problem remains. Syntdx is indeed labelled as the object, but the object ofwhat? 
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What we want to show is that it is the object of likes, but this is not what the 
diagram is actually showing. 
This is only one example of the kind of problem that faces any grarnmarian 
grappling with the complex realities of natural languages. Many of the other 
problems are similar to this one, arising from the possibility of using elements in 
positions other than the ones where they might normally be expected; but many 
of them involve other kinds of complexity. In the foiíowing section 1 shall hint at 
some of the solutions that have been suggested to this one problem, but some of 
these solutions are suficiently general to solve problems of many different kinds. 
8. Some ways to enrich phrase structure 
The problem, then, is how to show that Syntax is both the topic of the top 
clause and the object of the lowest one in (19b): 
(1 9) b. Syntax Fred denies that he likes. 
Al1 the solutions that we shall consider in this section build on the view of 
sentence-structure as a hierarchy of increasingly large 'phrases', but enrich the 
basic view that 1 have sketched. However, it is important to repeat that they 
don't al1 start from the same basic view; in particular, some theories allow 
functional labels like 'subject', and others don't. This difference is important 
when it comes to enrichments. 
The best-known solution is probably the transformational one, adopted by GB 
(and, in a slightly different way, by Relational Grammar). Since a single structure 
wont aüow us to show both of the links that involve syntax, we use (at least) two 
structures, one showing syntax as the topic of the whole sentence, and the other 
showing it as object of likes. Each of these trees is a very simple structure, with 
the simplest kind of (non-functional) labels on its joints and twigs, but by 
combining two of these very simple trees we can deal with very complex senten- 
ce-patterns. These trees are bound together, as part of the total analysis of a single 
sentence, by means of rules called 'transformations' which transform one tree into 
another - thereby allowing an item like syntax to be moved out of its 'lower' object 
position into the 'higher' topic position. The latter position is where it actuaüy 
occurs - i.e., where we see it - in (19b), so it can be described as relatively concrete 
(or 'surface'), whereas the other position is much more abstract. 
The logic of this kind of analysis encourages linguists to accept increasingly 
abstract analyses in which neither the number nor the order of elements bears 
any simple ielation to the elements in the surface structure. To sirnplify 
somewhat, the hall-mark of GB analyses is their use of extremely abstract trees 
with very simple labels. (You will recall that 1 said earlier that GB builds a great 
deal of information into the geometry of trees.) 
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Some other theories solve the problem by enriching the labels rather than 
increasing the number and abstractness of the trees. In Generalised Phrase 
Structure Grammar, for example, we give (19b) a single surface tree similar to 
the following: 
(21) 
A 
NP A 
NP 
"r\ 
v 
"t ? 
A 
NP 
"r\ 
V NPINP 
Syntax Fred denies that he likes 
The main thing to notice about this tree is the series of extra labels which 1 have 
highlighted. In each case, the normal label (S, VP) is combined with 'INP' (to 
be read as 'slash NP'), which gives the extra information that a noun-phrase is 
missing from somewhere inside the sentence or verb-phrase concerned. These 
labels are like a trail of footprints to guide the rules which will eventually try 
to find an object for likes: if you can't find an object noun-phrase in the usual 
position, because it has gone elsewhere, try to find it by following its footprints 
up the tree. Technically, the slash label is a feature (a named variable which can 
have some value), and it is typical of the Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar 
approach to dealing with complexity by enriching the feature labels attached 
to a single concrete tree. Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar and Catego- 
rial Grarnmar both take a rather similar approach to the problem. 
Lexical Functional Grammar adopts a third solution to the problem of 
enriching the basic structure. Like GB, it does not restrict the syntactic structure 
of a sentence to nothing but a single, surface structure. But unlike GB, it adds 
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just one extra structure, and this extra structure is labelled exclusively with 
functional categories like 'subject' (hence its name, 'functional structure'). The 
two structures offer an easy and natural analysis of the problem sentence: syntdx 
is at the start of the sentence in the surface structure, but in the functional 
structure it is the object of the lower clause. The two positions are connected 
by a special rule for finding a 'path', which has similarities both to the 
transformations of GB and to the slash 'footprints' of Phrase Structure 
Grammar. 
In short, those theories that have solved this problem have found three quite 
different kinds of solution, al1 ofwhich involve in some way enriching the kinds 
of structure that can be used for showing the syntactic analysis of a tree: 
a. more information can be shown in the trees by increasing the number 
and abstractness of the trees for each sentence, but without any increase 
either in the complexity of the individual subtrees or in the labelling; 
b. more information can be packed into the labels, without any increase in 
the number or abstractness of the trees; 
c. more information can be shown by adding one extra tree which uses 
functional labels. 
Needless to say, theoretical linguists would very much like to know which of 
these approaches is nearest to the truth; in principle this is a researchable 
question, because the different approaches can be tested against the facts (our 
goalkeeper, if you remember). But at present the outcome of the game is still 
completely open. 
9. Advertiser's announcement: word grammar 
As 1 have already explained, linguists are al1 shooting at the same goal, which 
we can cal1 'truth', and we would al1 like to believe that either we personally, or 
the team to which we belong, is doing well in terms of goals scored. My own 
view is that al1 these teams, for al1 their importance, are missing a lot of goals, 
and 1 should like to end by introducing a group of pla~ers that 1 haven't 
mentioned so far. 1 think it would be fair to say that most members of the nine 
teams listed above would be united in considering this group unimportant 
(which is why 1 have ignored it so far), but it does pass one of our importance 
tests, and may even be capable of out-scoring the other tearns. 
Let me start by contrasting the beliefs of this group with the starting-point 
shared by al1 the others: the belief that the structure of a sentence is based on 
a hierarchy of phrases (clauses or sentences, noun-phrases, and so on). This 
view is rather like an analysis of a community of people which says that its 
structure can be defined only by identifying successively smaller sub-commu- 
nities. For example, the only relation that 1 can have to any of my colleagues, 
according to this theory, would be fellow-membership of groups such as 
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departments, faculties, committees and so on. There would be no way to say 
that 1 was a friend of X, or collaborating with Y, because these are direct 
relations between them and me. Direct relations between individuals have no 
place in this kind of analysis. Similarly for syntax: direct relations between 
words have no place in a theory which is based on phrases. 
This is not the only possible view, though most of its adherents pay little or 
no attention to any alternatives. Nor is its history very long, compared with 
the history of grammatical theorizing (which in Europe dates back to the 
Ancient Greeks); it was only introduced in the 1930's, by the American linguist 
Leonard Bloomfield (1933). The alternative is, of course, to recognise direct 
relations between words, and to take these word-word relations as the basis for 
syntactic analysis. This alternative has for a long time been accepted in the 
teaching of grarnmar in schools throughout Europe (though it has died, with 
al1 grammar-teaching in UK schools). This is especially true in Eastern and 
Central Europe. 
To see what difference these theoretical abstractions make, consider what 
the two approaches say about sentence structure. If we take the phrase-based 
approach, we say that a clause or sentence has a subject, which is a noun-phrase; 
but if we take the other approach, it is not a clause or sentence, but a verb (i.e., 
a word) that has the subject, and the subject is not a noun-phrase, but a noun. 
Both kinds of analysis allow the subject noun to be accompanied by other words 
(adjectives, determiners and so on), but the word-based analysis treats this 
entirely as a private matter (so to speak) between the noun and its companion 
words, without setting up a 'noun-phrase' to hold them al1 together. 
These word-word relations are called 'dependencies', because they are always 
asymmetrical, one word being the 'dependent' ofthe other, its 'head'. Tradition- 
al grammar uses words like 'govern', 'modify' and even 'belong' or 'take' to 
describe dependencies, as in the following statements: 
(22) a. In German, the preposition ZU governs a dative noun. 
b. Big modifies book in the combination big book. 
c. In I told him yesterday that syntax was f in,  the word yesterday 
belongs to told). 
d. The verb OUGHT takes to (or a 'to-infinitive'). 
Various systems have been used for displaying dependency relations, inclu- 
ding one which looks remarkably similar to the tree notation for phrases. Here, 
first, is a simplified 'phrase-marker' (i.e., a phrase-based tree) for It is hot in 
Barcelona: 
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It is hot in Barcelona 
The crucial thing to notice here is that there are labelled nodes in the tree not 
only for the five words (classified as 'noun', 'verb', 'adjective' or 'preposition'), 
but also for seven phrases. Now contrast this with what we might cal1 a 
'word-marker' for the same sentence: 
It is hot in Barcelona 
In this diagram, there are no phrase nodes, and the vertical dimension shows 
dependency, not the part-whole relation of the phrase-marker. It is true that 
some phrases are implicit in the word-marker (e.g. you can see that in Barcelona 
is a phrase, whereas hot in is not), but they can stay implicit because, according 
to this approach, they are redundant. The labels on the diagonals name the 
relations (subject, complement, adjunct) between the words concerned. 
Diagrams like this word-marker are used by some linguists, but for various 
reasons 1 prefer a different notation, in which the direction of dependency is 
shown by arrows rather than by using the vertical dimension. In these diagrams, 
the arrow points from the head to the dependent: 
It is hot in Barcelona. 
The vertical arrow linking is to nothing at al1 shows that this word is the 'root' 
of the whole sentence, because it depends on no other word within the sentence 
(or anywhere else, for that matter). Once again, the thing to notice is the 
complete absence of any unit larger than a word - not even the sentence appears, 
as such, in the diagram. 
1s this word-based approach really different from the phrase-based ap- 
proaches? After all, phrases lurk beneath the surface of this diagram, as 1 have 
already pointed out, because the dependencies group the words into phrase-like 
clusters. Each of these 'phrases' has a single word as its root, just as the whole 
of this sentence is rooted in is; and similarly, in Barcelona counts as a phrase 
(rooted in in). Does it really matter then whether we show these patterns in 
terms of phrases, or in terms of word-word dependencies? 
Yes, it does. For one thing, it makes a radical difference to the way we analyse 
a sentence's structure. As we noted earlier, phrase-based approaches differ 
according to whether or not they recognise a phrase (the 'predicate' or 'verb- 
phrase') consisting of the verb plus al1 its dependents except the subject. But if 
we start from dependencies, it is quite simply impossible to recognise such a 
phrase, even implicitly, because the subject is a dependent of the verb along 
with its other dependents. Does this limitation count for or against dependency 
analysis? If it really is essential to recognise verb-phrases, because there are facts 
which simply can't be stated in any other terms, dependency analysts should 
seriousIy consider abandoning the match (or switching sides). But if verb- 
phrases can be dispensed with (given the other assumptions of dependency 
analysis), then we can celebrate a victory because our theory predicts that such 
phrases are dispensable - and is vindicated by the facts. The issues are complex, 
but on balance things look good for dependency grammar. 
Another difference between word-word dependencies and phrases as the 
basis for analysis lies in the treatment of discontinuous phrases , phrases which 
are split by other words which don't belong to them. These are very common, 
and are one of the main head-aches for any syntactician (because it is generally 
agreed that they are atypical- most languages are organised in such a way that 
most phrases are continuous). We have already looked at one exarnple, pro- 
duced by topicalisation as in (19b), Syntax Fred denies that he likes. Here the 
discontinuous phrase is syntax ... he likes, which is rooted in likes (notice that 
he is its subject, and syntax is its object). As we saw, a range of clever tricks have 
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been developed for dealing with examples like this, but one option is excluded 
in principle by most of the theories we have considered: that of allowing a phrase 
to be discontinuous. 
This exclusion is fundamental to most of the notations we considered; for 
instance, how could we use brackets to mark off a discontinuous phrase? Any 
brackets we put round syntdx ... be likes, for example, will also include words 
which are not part of this phrase (Fred denies that). Now let's suppose we start 
with dependencies as the basis for analysis. We can easily recognise that phrases 
are normally continuous; to achieve this, al1 we need to say is that dependency 
arrows normally mustn't cangle. But this is just the normal pattern, and we may 
well expect exceptions (just as we expect exceptions in other parts of the 
grammar, such as in the rules for forming past-tense verbs). Provided we can 
make it clear precisely which patterns are allowed to break the rule, we can 
allow phrases to be discontinuous. This leads to dependency diagrams like (26), 
in which we give syntax two different dependencies in the same structure, one 
to denies, as its 'topic', and one to likes, as its object. Rather conveniently, we 
can separate the arrows for these dependencies by drawing one above the line 
of word-class labels and the other below it. 
Syntax Fred denies that he likes. 
The social background to dependency analysis is quite important in under- 
standing why it has had so little impact on theoretical syntax. Part of the 
explanation lies, 1 suspect, in its very success in school-teaching. In countries 
where it is the basis for grammar-teaching in schools, it is naturally accepted as 
unproblematic by those who apply it in academic research. In Europe a lot of 
highly regarded linguists use it; for example, a European mega-project on 
automatic translation, called Eurotra, uses dependency analysis as the basis for 
its syntactic processing. However, using something is not the same as theorising 
about it, and on the whole those who have used it have taken it for granted as 
something so familiar and well developed that there's no need to agonise about 
its theoretical bases. Since they publish few theoretical articles about it (least of 
al1 in English), it is not surprising that linguists who do theorise about grammar 
have little reason to think about it or to consider it as an alternative to 
phrase-structure. 
48 Links & Letters 1, 1994 Richard Hudson 
In spite of this basicall~ non-theoretical stance of dependency analysts, 
dependency grammar has recently started to have more influence on western 
linpistic theories. Most obviously, many of the phrase-based theories that 1 
described recognise the asymmetrical relations among the words in a phrase by 
picking out one of them as the phrase's 'head' (what 1 have been calling its root; 
some theories use other terms). This is true of Categorial Grammar, Generalised 
Phrase Structure Grammar, GB, Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar 
(notice the name!) and Relational Grammar. GB has gone even fürther, as it 
includes an elaborate subtheory called 'government theory' (reflected in the 
name of the whole theory, 'Government and Binding theory'), which allows us 
to build what is (in al1 but name) a dependency structure on top of a phrase 
structure. These dependency features (and others) have been added during the 
last two decades, and have been presented as theoretical innovations, but they 
have rather obvious roots in traditional grammar. 
A few of us have gone even further, by developing theories in which 
dependency-like ideas aren't just glued onto phrase-based theories, but in which 
these ideas are fundamental. (1 should add that this process can be painfül, but 
stimulating; 1 myself started from a phrase-based theory, Systemic Functional 
Grammar, and was very surprised, and disturbed, to find how weak the evidence 
for the phrase-based approach was.) My own work has led to a theory called 
Word Grammar which 1 have described in a number of works including two 
books (Hudson 1984, 1990). Unfortunately, by none of our criteria does this 
theory count as important, but 1 think 1 have scored enough goals to make it 
worth pursuing the ideas in the theory, though some shots still bounce back to 
me (as they do, incidentally, for everyone else too!). Maybe it will turn out to 
be fundamentally wrong, and popular choice will have been vindicated; if so, 
only a handful of people (a few of my research students and myself) will have 
wasted their time. But we have to explore every idea, because at this stage of 
the game we really have no idea which ideas will eventuall~ turn into the 
Eventual Winner. 
10. The great cup final 
Any reader with some experience of traditional grammar and none of 
modern theoretical grammar may well be wondering at this point why we are 
taking so long to get syntax sorted out, especiall~ since we are building on two 
thousand years of work dating back to Greek and Latin grammarians (who 
supplied notions like 'noun', 'tense' and 'subject'). The problem is that grammar 
turns out to be very, very complicated. The individual structures and rules are 
often reasonably simple, but what is complex is the way they interact not only 
with one another, but with virtually everything else in our minds as well - with 
what we know about the immediate past (for which notions like 'topic' are 
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relevant), with what we know about human behaviour, and with a good deal 
of what we know about the world at large. Added to which, grammar is 
ultimately located in the minds of individual speakers, each of whom is unique 
in the tiny details but who also form extremely complicated alliances called 
dialects and languages. Al1 these complexities are grist for the grammarian's mill. 
One thing is absolutely certain: there is no chance of a definitive, stable, 
universaíly-accepted general theory of syntax in the 20th century. We are 
certainly further from the beginning of the journey than we were, say, 30 years 
ago; but the end is still nowhere in sight, and it is only optimism that allows 
the belief that we are getting nearer to it al1 the time. 
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